I don't know if I can "will" myself to go on autopilot. It seems like if there is a conflict in some meta-reasoning level, in values, life principles or general beliefs, I might be experiencing more depression-like symptoms until I try to resolve the conflict. Sometimes I can resolve the conflict myself, reflecting or journaling, and sometimes I need a professional therapist to guide the process. So, I'd say it's not that reflection leads to depression; more likely it is depression that leads to reflection, or some internal conflict that causes both depression and increased reflection. Then reflection by itself does not consistently solve the problem, but only a specific kind of reflection.
There is a mistake right in the beginning, not sure how it affects the conclusions yet. The variables given are S - System variable (some kind of disturbance), Z is the outcome ( a controlled variable) and R is the action of a controller. The causal relations between them are S affects Z, S affects R, and R affects Z.
> The archetypal example for this is something like a thermostat. The variable
S represents random external temperature fluctuations. The regulator R
is the thermostat, which measures these fluctuations and takes an action (such as putting on heating or air conditioning) based on the information it takes in. The outcome Z is the resulting temperature of the room, which depends both on the action taken by the regulator, and the external temperature.
The problem here is that the regulator R does not measure external temperature. It just measures the controlled variable - the temperature Z, so the causal arrow should go from Z to R too, and the arrow from S to R does not exist.
I wonder if the theorem is another way of showing how hard control is without feedback. And I can't quite figure out if it addresses dynamic systems as opposed to static ones.
> Not seeing the revolution here. Most of the ideas here have been seen before. Did I miss something?
The reviewer is a psychologist, with some interesting opinions and criticisms of psychology. My impression is that applying control theory to study human behavior should be the revolutionary thing, for psychology.
This is not new ground. See Cybernetics: Or Control_and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (1948) by Norbert Wiener. Wiener wrote a popular version, "The Human Use of Human Beings".[2]
There's a whole history of cybernetics as a field. This Wikipedia article has a good summary.[3]
The beginnings of neural network work came from cybernetics. As with much of philosophy, areas in which someone got results split off to become fields of their own.
Control theory and cybernetics were supposed to transform psychology in a much more dramatic and all-encompassing way, as argued by W.T. Powers, for example[1]. In modern psychology, the concept of negative feedback control is treated like a metaphore, a vague connection between machines and living things (with the possible exception of the field of motor control) . If psychology would take the concept seriously, then most research methods in the field would need to be changed. Less null-hypothesis testing, more experiments applying disturbances to selected variables to see if they are controlled by a participant or not.
That is the meaning I'm getting from the call to revolution.
Ah. The linked paper goes into that in more detail.
This was a hot idea right after WWII because servomechanisms were finally working. In movies of early WWII naval gunnery, you see people turning cranks to get two arrows on a a dial to match. By late WWII, that's become automatic. Anti-aircraft guns are hitting the target more of the time. Early war air gunner training.[1] Late war air gunner training - the computer does the hard part.[2] Never before had that much mechanized feedback smarts been applied to tough real-world problems.
This sort of thing generated early AI enthusiasm. Machines can think! AGI Real Soon Now! Hence the "cybernetics" movement. That lasted about a decade. They needed another nine orders of magnitude of compute power. Psychology picked up on this concept, but didn't do much with it.
I'm not sure I had the same issue, it is a different laptop, but it would not go to sleep. The current solution is to make it hybernate instead of sleep.
The scientific community, or the ministry of science of some country, or a university - might find that paying for peer review, for example, might be more effective in promoting good science than paying for publication.
Perhaps that should also be compensated but you're talking about another cost associated with publication (and even non-publication). Since there's no guarantee that reviewers even read the crap they are assigned to read, I don't think paying them is the best approach. It would perhaps be better to publish the names of the reviewers. And if you reject a paper, you have to go on the record with your gripes. I'm sure these policies would slow reviews down an awful lot though. Reviews are only supposed to uncover blatant errors I suppose, and not offer definitive endorsement of results.
Where is the author's name? Strange editorial. Neuroscientists should "involve participants"? What if they cannot speak, like that guy Broca's area was found in?
>>Without a doubt, human neuroscience is entering a new and important era. However, it can fulfil its goals of improving human experiences only when study participants are involved in discussions about the future of such research.
I think it's just that bouba has o, and kiki has k. Also the b is half-round, and I is more spiky. Visual differences, not auditory.
edit: You make a round shape with your mouth in o
