Goodbill | Full Stack Engineer | Anywhere in the US | Remote | Full-time
Goodbill saves people money on hospital bills by identifying billing errors and inflated charges. We're a small, but growing, team and recently raised a seed round from Maveron, Founder's Co-op, Liquid 2, and some incredible angels. We currently work distributed across Pacific and Eastern timezones.
If you like complex problems, lots of data, doing something that's never been done before, changing people's lives, and want to tackle one of the hardest problems in medical billing, you're in luck. Benefits include competitive salary, generous equity, unlimited PTO, flexible work hours (we're all parents), 100% of medical/dental/vision, and a home office stipend or a co-working desk, whichever floats your boat most.
Goodbill | Full Stack Engineer | Anywhere in the US | Remote | Full-time
Goodbill saves people money on hospital bills by identifying billing errors and inflated charges. We're a small, but growing, team and recently raised a seed round from Maveron, Founder's Co-op, Liquid 2, and some incredible angels. We currently work distributed across Pacific and Eastern timezones.
If you like complex problems, lots of data, doing something that's never been done before, changing people's lives, and want to tackle one of the hardest problems in medical billing, you're in luck. Benefits include competitive salary, generous equity, unlimited PTO, flexible work hours (we're all parents), 100% of medical/dental/vision, and a home office stipend or a co-working desk, whichever floats your boat most.
There's almost no clearer indication that the speed of business is quickening at an amazing pace. In the scooter world, the land grab is on, and everyone is looking at ride sharing as the obvious analog, which means raise a lot of money, expand to new cities, and earn market share... quickly.
Whether a couple (or all) of these companies flame out remains to be seen, and is probably likely. But there's also likely to be a winner in this category. And the winner is likely to be worth a lot of money. These companies likely don't "deserve" their valuations based on current metrics like revenue, but the market potential is huge, the growth is high, and the capital requirements are large... so investors seem more than willing to make bets.
This sounds exactly like the ridesharing model. Drown the market in money, kill off your competitors by undercutting on price, then jack up prices to make a business.
The problem, like ridesharing, is once you start raising prices, you just lost all of your customers to a new competitor that hasn't spent all of their money.
I don't see how this model can possibly work. The barrier to switching is almost 0 to the user - you can already see that by looking at the Uber & Lyft tags on every car you get in. Installing another app isn't as hard as swapping insurance providers or mobile platforms.
Of course this hasn't happened in the rideshare market yet - it's cheaper than ever before. I've found Uber Express prices to be almost unbelievably cheap recently.
Seems like there's at least some non-zero chance that these prices remain low until autonomous vehicles make them permanent and sustainable.
Only chance I see is put cameras on them collect the visual data along with the other sensors then you have a run away data set for a set of autonomous vehicle that navigates a sidewalk.
I'm not sure this is a sign that the speed of business is really quickening all that much. VC-funded bubbles provide a local acceleration in business speed, but they also drastically increase risks and systemic waste.
It's also not clear to me that there will be "a winner" once the VC money runs out. There's no "a winner" in the convenience store market, for example. A study lists 202 viable convenience store chains, the smallest has over 30 stores. [1] And that ignores the many one-off chains, and some of the places like Walgreens and CVS that clearly substitute for convenience stores for many.
That's what both Lyft and Uber thought, but instead the market has withstood two vigorous competitors, alongside strong regional competitors such as Ola, Careem, and Didi. Though margins are much higher with scooters.
I genuinely don't understand this. They can't realistically need the money, since they just raised. There's no fundamental change to their numbers or outlook in a month. There's been no obvious regulatory relaxation to take advantage of. Even if I buy the "Uber might buy us" thesis, surely it's better value for me as an existing investor to get a bigger portion of a slightly smaller check, than try to fix in an astronomical valuation by bailing more cash into the business? I really don't get the sense in this move at all.
> They can't realistically need the money, since they just raised.
Keep that very same money from getting showered on a competitor? If a large chunk of money is looking for a foot on the ground in your market, opening your hands and taking it might be the only way to survive.
Sure, and if they manage to fix a valuation of $1.5B or even $2B, it will drive a lot more press. Are they then going to go out in July and hoover up a bunch more cash?
I understand that when a capital-intensive business sees an opportunity to grab some cash, it can make a lot of sense. There's more constraints than the scooters for them - finding the right locations, setting up bird squads, ensuring there's a kind of natural circle of travel rather than a tide of commuting. And, of course, marketing all of that at the right time. Some of that $$$ can solve, but it doesn't feel like they're at the point they can just step on the gas.
I wouldn't want to use a GPS tracked scooter. The company might sell my location data or get hacked. Better to buy a non-GPS tracked scooter of my own.
Your phone is constantly tracked by the cell towers it communicates with and in urban areas that's quite accurate location data. This data is sold to third parties.
Speed is one of the most underemphasized traits of a great VC for founders. While fundraising, a quick yes is the best answer, but a quick no is the second best. Investors who follow this are truly founder friendly: it's easy to stall and wait for more data, but it's actually helping the entrepreneur to just say no. Those are the investors I want to pitch again later.
It's no surprise founders rank speed highly while investors don't. Find investors who care about speed and you'll find a great partner.
>It's no surprise founders rank speed highly while investors don't.
There may be some nuance missing in the slide.[1]
Based on the article's text, that right column should actually be subtitled "what VCs think the founders rank as most important" instead of "important to VCs".
The left side is self-reporting (founder's ranking). But the right side is a "Theory of Mind"[2] exercise (what VCs think founder's ranking would be).
I'm not a VC but it seems to me that that "network/rolodex" should be higher rank than "speed". I wonder if founders rank speed above "rolodex" because many startups' bank accounts are near zero and they can't make payroll next week if the VCs drag their feet. Financial duress scenarios like that during fundraising may make founders overemphasize "speed of a deal" to the detriment of other more important factors.
At least anecdotally, I don't hear much from founders who are that close to zero. In my experience, speed is important because slowness drastically increased cognitive load and somewhat increases risk during fundraising. And also because fundraising is a distraction from why they got into it.
One way to think about it is in terms of a graph of number of VCs they have to think about/deal with at once. They're going to start the fundraising process with a list of firms, people, etc. Let's say that each week they take on n new items. If it takes 4 weeks to get an answer, they're juggling n*4 balls, many of the conversations in different states. Complexity goes up and/or throughput goes down. It's painful.
I suspect for entrepreneurs speed it also code for clarity, in that the "vc no" (and specifically the "California no" [1]) often present as slowness when it's really about something else inside the VC.
>Speed is one of the most underemphasized traits of a great VC for founders.
Definitely. Well that, and writing checks.
If you're printing money, live in the United States, and have an IQ of 120 (a bit over 1 std deviation above mean) from a high-tech startup, it should take less than an hour to raise $100,000 seed round on standard terms. Okay, call it a week, even a few weeks or months.
Instead, for 90% of founders who match that description, 1 year of full-time work trying to raise the mentioned seed round would not be sufficient to do so (about 2,000 hours of work). In fact "impossible" may be a good description of the possibility for them to do so.
Without reference to sources, take a guess: how many first financings for startups will have happened in 2018? Let's work through this together, I'll give you some data, you can use it to work on your guess, then I'll reveal the answer.
A good place to start your thinking is that if we take a single academic cohort, say, people graduating college this year, there will be about 2.03 million bachelor's degrees conferred[1]. If we then look at every single year (you can try to raise money any year from when you're 18 to 80), and if we add people who dropped out without an undergraduate degree -- this is true for Bill Gates and Steve Jobs for example -- we might expect, say, around 200,000 seed-stage financings nationally at the very, very lowest-end. On the high end, I'd be pretty shocked if there were 2 million, since that would be 1 out of every 162 people living in the United States receiving seed funding this year (or 0.6%) and not that many people are starting companies every year. As mentioned, that's the number of undergraduates graduating annually. Some more data for you: the number of businesses in the United States less than a year old is around 650,000[2].
Okay, ready? Here is the actual number of startup first financings that will have occurred in 2018: 1,750 [3]
That is less than half of the number of undergraduates who are just right now enrolled at just MIT. [4] Would you fund one of them who just started printing money? How about someone who graduated from there (or dropped out) 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 years ago? Or from Stanford? Or Harvard? Or UC Berkeley? Or indeed anywhere else where they learned to program and start printing money.
If you're a VC the answer is "No, you wouldn't".
Do these numbers make sense to you?
At the moment I can't raise < $150K with paper millionaire cofounders. I can't get a term sheet even at an 80% discount (discount I offered on a safe note). (Okay a VC offered me <$20K for effectively 51% on non-standard terms.).
But I shouldn't be doing that - trying to raise money, I mean. I should be selling cereal: because Airbnb, a technical company that was renting apartments over the Internet, found it easier to sell cereal profitably on national television than to get first financing.[5]
Most people who raise seed rounds aren't "printing money", and quite a few people who are "printing money" are printing the wrong kind of money to raise venture funding on.
>and quite a few people who are "printing money" are printing the wrong kind of money to raise venture funding on.
Only if you agree with the premise that "Venture Capitalists Get Paid Well to Lose Money".[1]
(I don't agree with that conclusion, I just think they're not writing enough checks for their own purposes.)
In that case the right kind of company in 2018 is an AI social media machine learning cloud platform startup, and there's a whole lot fewer than 1000 of those total worldwide due to the simple fact -- and I think you can see the end of this sentence coming -- that I just spouted gibberish.
More seriously, when Airbnb was founded ten years ago it wasn't the right company either, and the only pivot it made is from being a "rent out your apartment to tourists over the Internet" company 9 years ago to a "rent out your apartment to tourists over the Internet" company with 4 million lodging listings in 65,000 cities and 191 countries which has facilitated over 260 million bookings and as of a year ago, closed a $1 billion round at a $31 billion after becoming profitable in 2016.[2] The founders did this by selling cereal.
No, sorry, you're right that venture capital as an asset class underperforms most other investments, but that doesn't mean that every company that is "printing money" should receive investment. The mathematics of venture investing only work for a subset of businesses.
My company has a Y2 ARR(!) and revenue target that I think would make a lot of YC companies pretty happy, but we are not a sensible investment for venture capitalists.
Actually you're an extremely sensible investment. :)
If you could close it in an hour how much money would you raise on standard terms and at what valuation? (You can list both as a multiple of any metric you pick - any metric, including unjustified projections if you want - if you don't want to name figures here.) Obviously given what I just shared I'm not a VC.
No, we're a nonsensical investment: there is no story we can tell about how our equity becomes liquid in 10 years, and our growth, while very pleasant for us principals, is unlikely to lead us to a place where our eventual liquidity would pay for the failures of the other 9 companies in a portfolio that included us.
It's not a moral debate. The portfolio math has to work, and things have to work on a timescale that works for fund LPs. At the end of the day, venture capitalists are simply an adapter cable that plugs small chunks of LP endowments and funds into baskets of companies with an N% chance of exiting >7x within Y years. If your company can't do that, the adapter cable doesn't fit your company.
You seem to be mostly right. In the past, VCs funded crazy moonshots and local banks funded sensible old-school companies with 10% per year growth and 15% profit/revenue ratios.
Small community banks don't really exist anymore, and large banks don't really seem to be funding anything under $10 million nowadays, except mortgages.
This doesn't really offer that; it documents a seed round raised by angels by a company that doesn't want to engage institutional VC because they demand a 10x success.
VCs aren't demanding 10x successes because they're lazy; they do it because the winners have to pay for the losers. This isn't even a VC-specific pattern; you see it in almost every hits-driven business.
Respectfully, I think this is a rather muddy estimation of probabilities and returns, as I can illustrate like this:
Suppose I had $100 million to spend on literal lottery tickets and my goal was to average a 10% per year return on it across all of my "investments". Mainly I try to find places that haven't paid out a large jackpot yet receive low media coverage, so that I have a positive expected return: then I buy a whole lot of lottery tickets there without alerting my competitors to the fact that the lottery tickets have a positive expected value due to the accumulated jackpot, that people seem unaware of.
Now: if my bank where I'm keeping the $100 million, which is stable and conservative, gives me an offer to purchase a 1-year bond from them that pays 12% should I take it? Will it help me achieve my goal of netting 10% returns?
You may think, "No - because that 12% is not going to pay for the non-winning lottery tickets."
But this is muddy thinking because the 12% is not in the same basket of risks as the lottery ticket purchases. It is simply incorrect thinking to group them together.
So yes, tying some of the money up for a year in a bond that pays 12% will help me make my goal of earning a 10% return, even if my strategy is to earn 10% by buying jackpots.
Of course I can be stupid and blow the $100 million on nationally announced huge jackpots where everyone else knows about it and all my competitors are also buying tickets, so that the expected value of the tickets is actually less than I pay for them. That's before the loss that I take on all the logistics, my office, etc. This is kind of what VC's do. They lose money.
You can characterize it descriptively, but please don't call it a sensible strategy.
---
I'm still curious about your answer to how much money you would raise (perhaps expressed as a multiple of something) and at what valuation (again as a multiple of something, even projections if you want), if you could close it in an hour no questions asked. Just to throw this out there, I wouldn't raise $100 million at a $1 billion valuation for example, since I don't have any good use for $100 million. How much would you raise if you could, and at what valuation?
Forget the VC's, they're not in this conversation. We've already established they're in it to live on someone else's dime and lose money ;)
>Suppose I had $100 million to spend on literal lottery tickets[...] Now: if my bank where I'm keeping the $100 million, which is stable and conservative, gives me an offer to purchase a 1-year bond from them that pays 12%
In your hypothetical... if "lottery tickets" are the metaphorical stand in for "unproven startups", what does the bond paying 12% realistically stand for?
There isn't a AAA-rated bond that pays 12%. Or, to generalize further, there isn't an investment vehicle <X> that guarantees to pay VC_hoped_for_returns plus +2%. (In any case, if we're talking about AAA bonds, the LPs can just invest in that themselves without involving VCs as middlemen. E.g. you don't need VCs to buy US Treasuries on your behalf.)
To get higher interest rates that compete with good VC returns, you're getting into junk bond territory. Junk bonds have higher risk for defaults. Junk bonds require more research to assess returns. One could also try to sell the bonds on the bond market before the maturity but either way, you're now back in "lottery ticket" territory for bonds.
You're creating fictitious scenarios that don't have realistic choices.
I just meant to show the probabilities. (Such a bond wouldn't have to pay for non-winning tickets.)
Whole scenario is totally unrealistic. (Though if I parked $100M in cash at a bank I would not be surprised if it offered me a AAA bond @ 12% for, say, $500K. This will cost them $60K per year or 0.06% of this totally unrealistic principal. Maybe they'd do this to mollify me, I don't know. Point is, if my target is 10% returns then I should accept!)
What the bonds stand for is tptacek's business, which " has a Y2 ARR(!) and revenue target that I think would make a lot of YC companies pretty happy" but is "not a sensible investment for venture capitalists".
You're saying we could do a debt financing to expand the business. Yes, we could do that. We wouldn't, because debt sucks, but I agree it's an option that is available to us, where venture funding is (I think, and am fine with) not.
>where venture funding is (I think, and am fine with) not
well yeah, if someone doesn't want venture funding no VC is going to beat down their door and make them re-do their business plan so they can take an equity investment :)
what I said applies more to companies that do want or need venture capital for their plans. These startups are not getting enough first financing checks.
In addition to the point 'jasode makes, I think there's an additional unrealistic subtext to the argument you're making, which is the idea that companies with stable but unspectacular growth are somehow less risky than shoot-the-moon startups.
But this just isn't true. In addition to the fact that companies fail a lot more often than operators recognize, there's the fact that a company winding down after years of solid but unspectacular returns is also a failed investment. Companies don't have to lose product/market fit to "go out of business". All they have to do is fail to compete with the operators other options. Eventually, somebody else will outbid the company for key talent.
Slow-burn companies can keep going for decades before this happens. It's not bad to be a slow-burn company! I've spent most of my career in them! But to take money from LPs, you have to have a story about how you can pay them a return.
Yep: for companies at their first financing stage, "companies with stable but unspectacular growth are somehow less risky than shoot-the-moon startups".
When small community banks disappeared (as nikanj points out), who would have financed these "sensible old-school companies with 10% per year growth and 15% profit/revenue ratios", that didn't make them riskier.
Meanwhile your subtext is that you just don't want to raise money. You spent a lot of words pinning it on how it's bad for VC's but all I asked you is what term sheet you'd write for yourself if you closed an hour later. None: you don't want investment. That's fine!
Companies with 10% growth Y/O/Y fail all the time. A portfolio of 10 of those companies will consist primarily of failures. Most of the companies in that portfolio will cease to exist without returning money back to investors. By your own definition, none of them will grow explosively, and so the winners can't pay back the losers. Pick a success rate and an investment multiple for the winners and do the math.
Banks do fund businesses like this, all the time. The difference is that they fund with debt instruments, not equity. You're obligated to pay them back and can't deliberately manage your business to avoid the obligation (chances are, you'll have to co-sign the obligation personally).
If all you're arguing for is broader availability of lines of credit, by all means, keep asking for that. But that's never been what startup investors provided.
I defined what I was arguing for: more checks written to startups that are already printing money and raising their first round.
In 2018 more than 1,800 startups are fantastic equity investments at a time when they're printing money, and VC's are idiots for writing 1,800 first funding round checks to startups total, nationwide. I couldn't believe how low that number is. You said, "well yeah they're printing money but it's the wrong kind of money". You would have called Airbnb the wrong kind of startup and you would have stood there and told me VC's are totally right not to invest in them. 9 years later here we are, $31B+ valuation.
It couldn't raise its seed round and it's obviously because VC's are idiots who are paid to lose money. It sold cereal on national TV instead. That's a fact.
No, Airbnb was self-evidently not the wrong kind of money. It was unclear whether Airbnb could succeed, but if it did, it was obvious how it would make truckloads of money. It’s practically the archetype of a shoot-the-moon business model.
I think we're talking past each other. I brought my company up as an example of "the wrong kind of money" because we're a services company, and no matter how much money we're printing today, we're unlikely to liquidate for 10x forward revenue. Airbnb, on the other hand, has a business model that can do that.
OK. I had thought you brought it up because you couldn't land any funding despite being able to generate great returns. Actually your example is orthogonal to startups that can't raise money for their big plans.
My original point was just that VC's don't write enough checks. thanks for the exchange.
The crux of your arguement is that the same returns can be derived using different set of probabilities and different kind of companies which probably won't achieve hyper growth but still are profitable and nice bet.
VC constraints:
1. VC has to get out within a specific timeframe, let's say 10 years and return all money to the LPs.
So VC can't afford to wait indenfinately collecting narrow streams of money.
That leaves you with very limited opportunities.
2. The number of companies they can deal with is small. There is a cost per transaction (funding), fewer transactions you make, better you do. But some transactions are must for VC math to work.
Banks also used to make only big loans in past. Micro lending is a recent thing. Algorithmic underwriting which doesn't even require manually looking at the balance sheet is based on heavy data collection, KPIs made feasable by technology advancement like big data processing etc..
3. VC can't fund anything which doesn't match their investment thesis. The LPs often start fund with a specific mission, for example, "advancement of AI for humanity". The VC partners often are veterans in specific industry and their resources are often useless in other industries.
This further reduces the number of companies they can fund.
4. You seem to assume all VC are chasing returns, well no! If our mission is "AI advancement". It's much better, if we've 2-3 focused winner companies in this niche. Fewer companies achieve better leverage, industry penetration, economies of scale and ofcourse, too big to fail.
5. Most of those small profitable companies are not able to keep stable revenue for 3years+.
One of the most misunderstood thing about VC, is that VC money wants maximum returns.
No! VC is a quest for control over new monopolies with enough holding, VC can influence and install their own management.
Money is cheap for them.
Imagine if you are an engineer and you own the largest semiconductor company. It's established fact that the old monopolies die and new disrupters emerge as new monopolies. You can't change this!
What you can do is control new disrupters by purchasing equity in them.
You do this by starting a VC fund and putting money derived from your semiconductor business in the fund. You can liquidate some of your holding it's not too hard.
Your VC funds thesis then becomes, "semiconductor advancement".
Then GPs will not chase the startups which have nothing to do with the semiconductor as their main focus.
If you don't do this, you watch your semiconductor empire dying. If don't even have stakes in new semiconductor disrupter monopoly, how do you maintain your dominance in this industry? That has a price, so absolute returns do not matter.
When a VC funded company dies, LPs do not cry. They cheer because another potential disrupter died trying, this can explain why some VCs are downright bad as they want you to fail.
Secondly, some VC funds have LPs who get their money from industry underdogs and really are after a disrupter who can unseat the current #1. So, they might be more helpful.
VCs are after potential disrupters.
Now if they want to kill the potential disrupter or help it grow that depends on the people who's money is at stake. No one is really going to share their motives upfront.
This was hugely interesting, I read it twice carefully. (Yes, you correctly interpret my argument but I was fascinated by the direction you went off in.)
I can see you're a new-ish member (created 7 days ago and shown in green), and have stealth in your name, but I reviewed your comments and they're really high-quality. I'd appreciate if you would get in touch with me at my email listed in my profile for some out-of-band followup questions. Thanks for sharing your perspective on HN and welcome again. Very good posts.
I recently saw your other post about raising funding for a hardware startup. Have you tried another attempt at crowdfunding (if your first one failed to reach the target)? csallen's indiehackers group may have more suggestions.
This is correct. The vast majority of funds have at least 1% committed by GPs. This is what Fred means when he writes, "The partners at USV make up a sizeable portion of our funds."
I'm a founder and CEO at MobileDevHQ[1], a startup focused on App Store optimization. We have been doing this work for almost a year and a half now and have built powerful tools for understanding the App Store, including keyword research and market/niche finders.
Appsleak looks interesting, congrats on launching! The app ecosystem needs more tools to help it mature and advance.
To those of you interested in understanding markets/niches and keywords in the app stores, it is important to note a couple main points:
First, there are large differences between Google/other web search volume and search volume in the App Store. At MobileDevHQ, we do lots of work to uncover those differences and provide realistic pictures of what is happening in the app stores themselves. For example, the volume on Google for "puzzles" likely has little relation to the volume in the app stores.
Also, competition as defined by number of search results is a great start to understanding the difficulty it will take for you to rank highly for a particular term, but it doesn't go far enough. At the end of the day, it is not just about number of results, but also the factors that the app stores use to rank results, and how "entrenched" those factors are in current results. You can only begin to understand this with lots of data, which is why we have been collecting this for years now and have even released a tool we call Sonar to help developers and marketers understand when an App Store changes its search algorithm.
There are tons of things I could riff on about App Store search, but those are the 2 most common thigs I see people missing, so I wanted to make sure I mentioned those in particular.
We do a lot of crawling various data sources. We spent over 3 years building a really great infrastructure to do this well. This is how we can present rank tracking for you and your competitors over time. The last time I checked, I think the number was actually over 500k... I should update that page!
Great point. Engineers sometimes like to see the broken in the world. Leaders need to have the tendency to see the possibilities. Emotional Intelligence is so, so hard (and something I struggle with consistently).
Totally true. In our case, it was after our seed round, once we were able to start selling and we felt as though we have proved the initial idea as being worthwhile to customers.
When that happened, we started hiring, and me coding turned into more of a detriment than an advantage. It was approximately a team size of 7-8 for us/e.
Certainly agree with this. Understanding where your customers are, what they're reading, and how to get in front of them is the most important factor.
But, after that, finding the most authoritative sources within those markets is crucial. So, when people say TechCrunch is irrelevant for mobile/tech startups, well, that's just wrong (at least for us).
Goodbill saves people money on hospital bills by identifying billing errors and inflated charges. We're a small, but growing, team and recently raised a seed round from Maveron, Founder's Co-op, Liquid 2, and some incredible angels. We currently work distributed across Pacific and Eastern timezones.
If you like complex problems, lots of data, doing something that's never been done before, changing people's lives, and want to tackle one of the hardest problems in medical billing, you're in luck. Benefits include competitive salary, generous equity, unlimited PTO, flexible work hours (we're all parents), 100% of medical/dental/vision, and a home office stipend or a co-working desk, whichever floats your boat most.
Tech stack: Rails 7, Hotwire
You can email me (https://www.linkedin.com/in/iseff) at iseff@goodbill.com or apply here https://www.goodbill.com/jobs/apply.