Manufacturers are now encrypting Canbus traffic, voluntarily on current and future models.
Buying or selling tools designed to break the law is already illegal - trivial or not. If a driver gets a DUI and possess a NOOP interlock, they are getting an additional charge, and get to help am investigation into the illicit device supply chain.
> Buying or selling tools designed to break the law is already illegal - trivial or not.
I'm curious how this will play out. The "John Deer" exemption from the DMCA comes to mind, not sure if it's strictly for farm equipment or still in effect.
You might be a functioning alcoholic, but when alcohol intoxication is so prevalent in your life it interferes with day to day routines activities, it absolutely meets the psychosocial definition of addiction, and likely points to a deeper one.
Every rural area I've ever worked in had a non trivial number of folks who would have 2-3 drinks at the bar/whatever on a Friday or a Saturday and drive home. It was not alcoholism, it was "I'm totally fine to drive, the law doesn't know my limits" etc.
On some level that's just the price of wanting to go out and not wanting to drop a bunch of cash on a taxi (assuming you can get one to come).
2-3 drinks on a Friday night when you're supposed to drive home is different. I'd also say "I can drink because the law is wrong" is also not exactly a neutral take.
- I believe the law is overly proscriptive / strict / wrong.
- I believe I won't get caught
It's no different to someone speeding because "It's clear conditions and I consider myself to be perfectly safe at this speed". Or skipping a stop sign "I can clearly see nothing is coming".
The LEA-vs-shift thread here kind of proves the point. Compilers are insanely good at that stuff now. Where they completely fall short is data layout. I had a message parser using `std::map<int, std::string>` for field lookup and the fix was just... a flat array indexed by tag number. No compiler is ever going to suggest that. Same deal with allocation. I spent a while messing with SIMD scanning and consteval tricks chasing latency, and the single biggest win turned out to be boring. Switched from per-message heap allocs to a pre-allocated buffer with `std::span` views into the original data. ~12 allocations per message down to zero. Compiler will optimize the hell out of your allocator code, it just won't tell you to stop calling it.
Agreed. It really requires an understanding of not just the software and computer it's running on, but the goal the combined system was meant to accomplish. Maybe some of us are starting to feed that sort of information into LLMs as part of spec-driven development, and maybe an LLM of tomorrow will be capable of noticing and exploiting such optimizations.
If you think compilers can't punch through abstractions, you haven't seen what whole-program optimization does to an overengineered stack when the programer gives it enough visibility. They still miss intent, so the game-specific hack can win.
AML tech is so primitive, it almost looks like it's designed that anyone 'in the know' will know how to not be detected.
Eg. Most AML checks are done because someone wrote some triggering keyword in the payment reference field. Do we honestly think a criminal mastermind won't manage to come up with something else to write there?
The AML you are thinking of is designed to catch small time crooks and drug mules (and maybe also dumb terrorist supporters). They are not really designed (or more specifically deliberately obtuse towards) Slavic oligarch money. Not all "corruption" and money laundering are treated equally. Places like London (not to mention Jersey), Switzerland, and Singapore are more for good old fashioned siphoning-of-national-assets type of corruption where there's almost always a "clean" paper trail to back things up. Also, don't get tax dodging mixed with money laundering. There are plenty of processes required by OECD and similar orgs, e.g. the concepts of a LEI number, that are not really useful against real oligarch/state level money launderers.
Here's a simple example: You lived in a former USSR/iron curtain state. During the chaos of '89 you managed to "acquire" lots of assets or finagle yourself into owning former public companies/real estate/factories. The paper trail is clean as far as your typical London banks are concerned because you are merely liquidating assets you own in your own country where there's a full paper trail (regardless of whether it was attained through illegitimate means). Alternatively, in a different narrative, you a rich international student from similar types of countries and you just happened to have "rich parents" who have plenty of money to throw around. It's a very different threat model than for example trying to prevent grassroots terrorism financing.
Money laundering vs tax evasion have a lot of overlap but don't get them confused. They are very different threat models from the perspective of the service provider (and it's also why many smaller foreign banks refuse to accept Americans as customers, partially because of the paperwork required to stay compliant with Uncle Sam).
If you want an actual no-questions-asked romp of organized crime type of money I believe the current main contenders are the middle eastern states like Dubai (pre Iranian conflict at least).
Rumor through the financial grapevine is that ironically there are many GCC middle eastern royalty/pseudo-royalty currently under house arrest who are trying to do the opposite i.e. get their assets out of the country because their main bank accounts are frozen domestically. So basically real life Nigerian princes.
(As for why they are under house arrest, it's kinda out of scope for HN but mostly because of domestic political purges, especially in Saudi Arabia from what I heard)
The rich international student pipeline has always stood out to me – we've seen dozens of 30, 40 or even 50 storey skyscrapers built for students, enjoying lifestyles usually reserved for those in high finance.
Well, I assure you most London bankers won't lose any sleep given that the money is often from Gulf states/places like China/ex Soviet oligarchies/various forms of corruption in the global south. The countries where the money flow out from often lack the means to actually pursue and prosecute overseas, especially for what boils down to "white collar" offences/corruption. It's only when anything like terrorism/organized crime/anything involving Uncle Sam's tax revenue occurs then the banks AML processes might become useful for more than just check-the-box compliance.
You will often find that entrepreneurs and digital nomads get caught in this sort of of AML debanking web because the paltry 6-7 figs of business/personal transactions across countries often resemble mules/illegitimate businesses and the banks are not allowed to talk about it. (Just go to the subreddit for wise or PayPal and search for the keyword "frozen")
Meanwhile international students can easily bring in 8 figs to buy houses and that's perfectly fine because it's "clean" as far as the compliance department is concerned. It's also a cultural issue, fintech platforms and neobanks try very hard to use heuristics to automate compliance. This is why I recommend digital nomads to use a proper cross border bank like HSBC Premier. You pay a lot more but you get a lot less of the "account frozen" bullshit.
Countries that are caught in between corruption and terrorist threats and Uncle Sam are the worst generally. E.g. transfering money both into and from Turkey are a pain in the ass.
Even with closed source clients, MitMing every conversation would likely be detected by some academic soon enough - various people take memory dumps of clients etc and someone would flag it up soon enough.
I think you would be hard pushed to find any big tech company which doesn't do some kind of A B testing. It's pretty much required if you want to build a great product.
A big tech company has ~10k experiments running at once. Some engineers will be kicking off a few experiments every day. Some will be minor things like font sizes or wording of buttons, whilst others will be entirely new features or changes in rules.
Focus groups have their place, but cannot collect nearly the same scale of information.
As someone who works in these orgs, only a small fraction are about user experience metrics. 90+% are extracting more short term value with unknown second order effects on usability.
Yeah, that's why we didn't have anything anyone could possibly consider as a "great product" until A/B testing existed as a methodology.
Or, you could, you know, try to understand your users without experimenting on them, like countless of others have managed to do before, and still shipped "great products".
I know this is a salty take, but reliance on A/B testing to design products is indicative of product deciders who don't know what they are doing and don't know what their product should be. It's like a chef saying, I want to make a pancake, but trying 50 different combinations of ingredients until one of them ends up being a pancake. If you have to test whether a product works / is good / is profitable, then you didn't know what you were doing in the first place.
Using A/B tests to safely deploy and test bug fixes and change requests? Totally different story.
I do wonder if thousands of years ago it might simply have been more socially acceptable to be nude for day to day life?
Cloth was presumably expensive, and so perhaps you would only own a few items of clothing, and therefore might not wear clothes every day? Or maybe only clothes for some purposes like for fighting (armour)?
Kinda sad that this was done less than 1000 years ago at presumably great human efforts, yet we have forgotten why we even did it.
Lack of record keeping is the key problem.
Will someone 1000 years from now know what you spent your lifetime working on? Will your lifetimes work also be a mystery to future generations and will they shrug and say "all this computer code must be for religious sacrifice, we can see no other purposes for it"?
Is there any way we can make the current era of humanity the 'well documented one', for example by etching all our digital data into diamonds to last millions of years?
> Will your lifetimes work also be a mystery to future generations and will they shrug and say "all this computer code must be for religious sacrifice, we can see no other purposes for it"?
I doubt any computer code will survive for 1000 years.
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