Taking your argument a bit farther: let's assume that indeed the only issue present is a faulty MCAS implementation and that gets fixed. If the aircraft comes with additional training and certification requirements for pilots before it can be safely operated, then arguably it cannot be lumped into the same type rating as the 737NG.
This would destroy the main selling point for Boeing (training pilots for a different type rating is a massive expense and headache for airlines), and would also mean that across the world there would be no pilots allowed to fly the existing 737MAX.
The point about not cancelling the 737MAX because of the risk that the new models developed would be rushed and unsafe due to Boeing rushing the development of a new design is... not very plausible I'm afraid.
Yes, I think that at least more training/certification of the pilots for the 737 MAX is needed.
My argument was, that after fixing MCAS and proper recertifying the 737 MAX there is no fundamental reason not to put it back into business. And that not putting it back into business also carries some safety risks. I never claimed that it should be put back into business because of that.
But Nader didn't present a fundamental reason why the machine would be unsafe and completely ignored the consequences of permanentely grounding the 737 MAX.
This would destroy the main selling point for Boeing (training pilots for a different type rating is a massive expense and headache for airlines), and would also mean that across the world there would be no pilots allowed to fly the existing 737MAX.
The point about not cancelling the 737MAX because of the risk that the new models developed would be rushed and unsafe due to Boeing rushing the development of a new design is... not very plausible I'm afraid.