> Game theory. If people vote for the party promising policies closest to (using whatever metric) their ideals, and there are only two parties, optimal strategy for each party is to move as close to the center as possible.
This theory requires either ignoring that voters may have a threshold at which they become disaffected or ignoring that political opinion may not be unimodal; if you consider both of those factors, that strategy ceases to be dominant.
In the real world, voters can become disaffected and abstain, and political opinion is often not unimodal (in the US it's closer to bimodal.)
This theory requires either ignoring that voters may have a threshold at which they become disaffected or ignoring that political opinion may not be unimodal; if you consider both of those factors, that strategy ceases to be dominant.
In the real world, voters can become disaffected and abstain, and political opinion is often not unimodal (in the US it's closer to bimodal.)