Your arguments are not supported by what is actually happening. They just rolled out child payments and I support that. Pensions grew very fast for 体制内 people and there is scant evidence that stimulates spending other than burdening local finances. 大病保险 reimbursement rate is also up a lot while office visit costs are kept very low and while I think that is good there's little evidence that it stimulates consumption.
Your attack on my analysis as annecdotes is ridiculous. For one to induce change one needs differential data to get the derivatives on proposed changes and your citation of national bulk statistics at a point does nothing of that sort. Secondly on the ground experience can provide directions that inform experimentations. Government finance is tight. You don't want to get another 100% GDP in debt with little to show (as in Japan). Thirdly this is not an academic forum and I am not an expert. If you feel like you are one you can write papers on your ideas. Attacking me isn't going to achieve anything.
> They just rolled out child payments and I support that
Absolutely, and it's a good start, but more can be done. This is literally the bare minimum.
> Pensions grew very fast for 体制内 people and there is scant evidence that stimulates spending other than burdening local finances. 大病保险 reimbursement rate is also up a lot while office visit costs are kept very low and while I think that is good there's little evidence that it stimulates consumption
体制内 only represent around 4% of Chinese according to the 2018 census [0], but I would be shocked if the number in 2025 has broken 5%. Most Chinese are not 体制内, and any impact of 体制内 social spending expansion has no bearing on China as a whole.
> Pensions grew very fast for 体制内 people and there is scant evidence that stimulates spending other than burdening local finances
Most Chinese - and especially elderly Chinese - are not 体制内. The majority of social safety spend it basically gated for 体制内.
> 大病保险 reimbursement rate is also up a lot
Show me the data and show the the trendline. What is the rate of change. Is it statistically significant?
While the rate of catastrophic health emergencies (ie. those health emergencies that can bankrupt a household) has reduced from ~16% in the early 2010s to ~13.8% in 2022 [1], this is still an elevated rate.
In both studies, severe spatial inequality was found. An acquaintance who was an alum of the same research group as mine who returned to China to work in healthcare investment banking and then a C9 research and lecturer position worked on a similar study, and they had to return to the US because their grant was pulled because it ruffled some feathers at their department.
> Your attack on my analysis as annecdotes (sic) is ridiculous
Anecdotal evidence is evidence that is unsourced. As I mentioned before, show me the data if you are giving assertions.
> You don't want to get another 100% GDP in debt with little to show (as in Japan).
Absolutely, and this is what makes me annoyed. Industrial policy is good, but the manner in which it was approached from 2017 onwards was reckless. Look at EVs as an example.
Billions of dollars were burnt by provincial owned SOEs to build EV brands yet none of them aside from SAIC has even come close to competing with private sector BYD (which had a comparative advantage of being a leader in battery chemistry for decades that pivoted into automotive around 2008-09). Nor did EV manufacturing provide a significant amount of jobs for a large number of provinces.
The comparative advantage that Guangdong, Shanghai, Zhejiang, and arguably Anhui had in automotive manufacturing should have meant the rest of the provinces in China and some of the central SOEs should have have even touched EV production, and could have reallocated capital to either building industries that these provinces had a comparative advantage in or spend on social welfare. Yet mid-level functionaries incentivized this kind of spending to climb up the ladder as well as induce demand on LGFVs during the real estate crisis.
And that's just EVs. This is a common problem across Chinese industry, and it is discussed at C9s and amongst diaspora academics as well, but the upper echelons of leadership response very very slowly. Heck, I was warning on HN that there was going to be central intervention into the EV price war years before the recent actions by the central government.
> this is not an academic forum
It is commonly accepted on HN to give sources to assertions, as a large subset of us were ex-academics.
> If you feel like you are one you can write papers on your ideas
Been there, done that. The research group I was affiliated with back when US-China relations were more optimistic advised on what became 精准扶贫 because of 李克强's backing.
> Attacking me isn't going to achieve anything
Asking for sources to assertions is not an attack. Asking for basic data analysis (which is a table stakes skill in the tech industry in 2025) is not an attack.
