> You also don't seem to understand the point of the signature. It's not to prevent fake images, it's to tie an identity to images so that that trust can be established and permanently lost in the case of a malicious actor.
It was proposed as a solution to: how is any future viewer going to tell your images from "AI" fakes?
You seem to be saying it is not a solution. I agree.
I have already said, it's done by establishing trust by tying identity to images. Your assertions aren't a counter to that. You thinking they are shows a lack of understanding of how to verify truth on a fundamental level.
Let's also list the points you have conceded by quietly giving them up:
1. Hacking the camera is irrelevant.
2. Images can be verified.
Do you want to actually engage with the conversation? The funny thing is that there are engineering challenges in this space, but you don't seem to understand the basics well enough to even get to that point.
> I have already said, it's done by establishing trust by tying identity to images.
You've said it, but you've not credibly substantiated it.
Imagine a famous photo journalist dies and there emerge "AI" fake pics signed with creds stolen from his hacked camera. Trust isn't part of a solution. It is part of the problem.
Then the cert is pulled with a date and the timestamps on the images can be used to verify when they happened. This is generally how you'd handle theft. You can then also resign with a new cert at a later date.
Besides, after a famous journalist dies, their work is already famous, people already know it or don't. This is a contrived and irrelevant example.
Again, this is not hypothetical, we already know how this works. Next one please.
And that's problematic if the certificate is also stolen at the same time, but that's why there is an authority to validate issues and address what needs to be done to resolve them.
It was proposed as a solution to: how is any future viewer going to tell your images from "AI" fakes?
You seem to be saying it is not a solution. I agree.